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Citizenship and Marriage in a Globalizing
World: Multicultural Families and
Monocultural Nationality Laws in Korea and
Japan
ERIN AERAN CHUNG* AND DAISY KIMABSTRACT

This Article analyzes how individual and local attempts to address
low fertility rates in Korea and Japan have prompted unprecedented
reforms in monocultural nationality laws. Korea and Japan confront
rapidly declining working-age population projections; yet, they have
prohibited the immigration of unskilled workers, until recently in
Korea's case, on the claim that their admission would threaten social
cohesion. Over the past two decades, both countries have made only
incremental reforms to their immigration policies that fall short of
alleviating laborshortages and the fiscal burdens of maintaininga large
elderly population. Instead, prompted by the growth of so-called
multiculturalfamilies in each country, the most significant reforms have
appeared in nationality laws: Korea's introduction of dual nationality in
2010 and Japan's2008 reform to grant Japanese nationality to children
born out of wedlock to a Japanese father and a foreign mother. While
neither country has introduced birthright citizenship to their nationality
laws, both sets of reforms target ethnically heterogeneous immigrant
women, their bicultural children, or both. This Article seeks to
understand how recent reforms to nationality laws in Korea and Japan
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have challenged long-held conceptions of blood-based belonging and
membership.
INTRODUCTION

Since 1990, Japan's Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare and
Korea's Ministry of Health and Welfare have issued reports warning of
the imminent demographic crises in both countries. Fertility rates had
begun to plummet below the population replacement level of 2.1
children per woman since 1975 in Japan and since 1984 in Korea,
reaching an all-time low of 1.26 in Japan in 2005 and 1.08 in Korea in
2005.1 By 2010, the percentage of the population aged sixty-five or older
reached 23.1 percent in Japan and 11 percent in Korea. 2 Japan's
National Institute of Population and Social Security Research estimates
that the working-age population will fall to approximately sixty percent
of Japan's total population by 2020 and approximately fifty-four percent
by 2050.3 The Korean prognosis is not much brighter: the estimated
working-age population in South Korea is expected to fall to
approximately fifty-four percent by 2050. In 2001, the United Nations
Population Division published a report on replacement migration that
estimated that Japan would have to admit approximately 647,000
immigrants and that Korea would have to admit 129,000 immigrants
annually in order to alleviate labor shortages and the fiscal burdens of
rapidly growing elderly populations.4
The Korean and Japanese governments have attempted to tackle
the problem of declining birth rates by providing subsidies for childcare
1. Kor. Stat. Info. Service, Vital Statistics, KOSIS (2010), http://kosis.kr/nsieng/
view/stat1O.do (enter "2005" into "Search Period" for Korean fertility percentages);
Standardized Vital Rates and Reproduction Rates, 2011 JAPAN STAT. Y.B. (Ministry Internal
Aff. & Commc'ns), available at http-/www.stat.go.jplenglishldatainenkan/backdata/143102.htm.
2. Kor. Stat. Info. Service, Population, Household, KOSIS (2010), http://kosis.krl
eng/database/database_001000.jsp?1istid=B&subtitle=Population,%20Household (citing the
percentage of those who are sixty-five years and older in Korea in 2010) (open "Population
Projections and Summary Indicators for Korea"; enter "2010" into "Search Period'); Stats.
Bureau, Preliminary Sample Tabulation of the 2010 Population Census of Japan Released,
MINISTRY INTERNAL AFF. & COMMC'NS (Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.stat.go.jp/english/info/
news/1932.htm.
3. NAT'L INST. OF POPULATION AND Soc. SEC. RESEARCH, POPULATION PROJECTIONS
FOR JAPAN: 2001-2050, at 3 (2002).
4. U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, REPLACEMENT MIGRATION: IS IT A SOLUTION
To DECLINING AND AGEING POPULATIONS?, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/20, U.N. Sales No.

E.01XIII.19 (2001), available at http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/migration/
migration.htm (referring to the period 2000-2050 for the constant age group, 15-64
(Scenario IV in Tables 21 and 22)).
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(both Korea and Japan), tax breaks for families with more than two
children (Korea), and guidelines for businesses to create more familyfriendly policies (Japan).5 Neither country, however, has opened its
borders to immigration at the level necessary to alleviate labor
shortages. Instead, both countries have made only incremental reforms
to their immigration policies that largely prohibit permanent immigrant
settlement.6 To be sure, the foreign populations in Korea and Japan
have grown exponentially over the past few decades, from slightly over
210,000 in 2000 to over 990,000 in 2009 in Korea and from
approximately 850,000 in 1985 to almost 2.2 million in 2009 in Japan.7
Nevertheless, their numbers make up less than two percent of the total
population in each country, which is well below the recommended thirty
percent outlined in the aforementioned UN report on replacement
migration.
While the national governments in Korea and Japan have aimed to
alleviate their respective demographic crises by creative incentives for
married couples to have more children, local governments, businesses,
and civil society actors, especially in the rural areas, have focused their
attention on finding spouses for unmarried, largely male, adults. In
Korea, the 1992 treaty to establish diplomatic and trade relations
between Korea and China opened the door to arranging marriage
meetings between Korean men and ethnic Korean (Chosunjok) women
from China that were brokered by local government officials and
agricultural associations in many rural areas.8 After 1999, with the
deregulation of the marriage industry in Korea, international marriages
expanded to include migrants from Southeast Asian countries and
CHULSAN GWA NODONGGONGGEUP:
SUPPLY OF MARRIED WOMEN: LIFEHYUN-JIN KIM, NEULGEO GA NEUN
L. Clark et al., Population Decline,
Labor Force Stability, and the Future of the Japanese Economy, 26 EUR. J. POPULATION,
222 (2010).
6. Dong-Hoon Seol & John D. Skrentny, Why Is There So Little Migrant Settlement in
East Asia?, 43 INT'L MIG. REv. 578, 579 (2009).
7. CHULIPGUK OEGUKIN-JEONGCHAEK TONGGYAE-YEONBO [ANNUAL STATISTICAL
REPORT FOR POLICIES ON IMMIGRATION AND FOREIGNERS] 259 (2009); Ministry of Internal
5. YOON-tOUNG CHO, GIHON YEOSEONG UI
SAENGAEJUGIMOHYEONG [CHILD BIRTH AND LABOR
CYCLE MODEL 26-31 (2006); HYUN-SEUNG LEE &
DAEHANMINGUK [AGING KOREA] 102 (2003); Robert

Affairs & Commc'ns, HistoricalStatistics of Japan, STATS. BUREAU, http://www.stat.go.jpl
english/data/choukilindex.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2011) (click on "Chapter 2: Populations
and Households"; scroll to "Migrants" subheading for Excel sheets containing statistical
data on "Foreigners who Legally Entered Japan by Status of Residence" for the years
"1954-1989" and "1990-2004" respectively) [hereinafter HistoricalStatistics of Japan].
8. Hye-Kyung Lee, InternationalMarriageand the State in South Korea: Focusingon
Governmental Policy, 12 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 107, 110-11 (2008). We apply the McCuneReischauer romanization to Chosunjok, which appears as Joseonjok, using the official
South Korean romanization system.
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Russia.9 By 2009, the number of so-called marriage migrants in Korea
had reached over 125,087.10 In Japan, local governments in depopulated
rural areas began to actively recruit migrant brides from the
Philippines, China, Taiwan, and Korea through arranged meetings and
private brokers from the 1990s.11 This trend departed from individual
efforts by Japanese men to find marital and/or sexual partners in Asian
countries from at least the 1970s, when the Philippines introduced
state-sponsored sex tourism. 12 By 2009, international marriages made
up approximately five percent of all marriages in Japan. 13
For decades, monocultural ideologies based on the myth of a oneblood nation (tanil minjok in Korean and tanitsu minzoku in Japanese)
have undergirded national identity and membership in Korea and
Japan. The migration and integration of ethnoculturally heterogeneous
brides and bicultural children have not only disrupted monocultural
ideologies about nationhood and membership, but they have also
presented legal challenges to nationality laws that reflect such
ideologies. Questions about how to integrate multicultural families have
given rise to the development of multicultural (damunhwa in Korean
and tabunka in Japanese) discourses in the public sphere. In Korea, the
government took the lead in embracing the integration of multicultural
families as official national policy, while, in Japan, attempts at
multicultural policy have been contained within local communities.
Such different approaches toward multicultural families have shaped
how each country has responded to pressures from different segments of
society to revise monocultural nationality laws.
Compared to the incremental reforms to immigration policies in
Korea and Japan, the growth of so-called multicultural families that
have emerged from marriage migration have prompted significant
reforms to each country's nationality laws. In 2010, Korea's National
Assembly passed a bill to allow dual nationality, which went into effect
9. Id. at 112.
10. CHULIPGUK OEGUKIN-JEONGCHAEK TONGGYAE-YEONBO [ANNUAL STATISTICAL
REPORT FOR POLICIES ON IMMIGRATION AND FOREIGNERS], supra note 7, at 257.

11. Hiroo Kamiya & Chulwoo Lee, InternationalMarriageMigrants to Rural Areas in
South Korea and Japan:A ComparativeAnalysis, 81 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. JAPAN (SPECIAL
ISSUE) 60, 64-65 (2009).

12. Cf. Nobue Suzuki, Transgressing"Victims": Reading Narrativesof "FilipinaBrides"
in Japan, 35 CRITICAL ASIAN STUD., 399, 402-03 (2003) (referring to a Japanese village
that brought in six Filipina hanayome [brides] for reproductive purposes through a
bilateral agreement with a city in the northern Philippines); id. at 405 (noting the position
put forth by the Filipina representative at the United Nations Women's Conference in
Nairobi in 1985 that marriages between Filipinas and Japanese men are an "extension of
prostitution").
13. Vital Statistics of Japan,MINISTRY HEALTH, LAB., & WELFARE, http://www.mlw.go.jp/
toukei/saikin/hwjinkou/suii09/marr2.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2012).

CITIZENSHIP AND MARRIAGE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD

199

in 2011.14 In Japan, the Supreme Court ruled in 2008 that children born
out of wedlock to a Japanese father and a foreign mother should be
granted Japanese nationality. 5 While neither country has introduced
birthright citizenship to their nationality laws, both sets of reforms
target ethnically heterogeneous immigrant women (Korea) and their
bicultural children (Japan), thereby challenging the core principles of
nationality laws premised on claims of ethnocultural homogeneity.
This Article analyzes how gendered migration has challenged longheld conceptions of blood-based belonging and membership and
subsequently created a political opening for revisions to nationality
laws. We thus seek to fill the theoretical gap between gendered
migration and citizenship by bringing to the fore the tensions between
the need to address demographic challenges, the intent to maintain and
control membership based on ethnocultural homogeneity, and the policy
outcomes that have undermined such intent. The following section
analyzes the relationship between citizenship and identity, especially
how notions of blood-based membership interact with the rights and
duties sanctioned by the state through formal citizenship. The
subsequent sections examine patterns of immigration to Japan and
Korea in the past few decades with special attention to the phenomenon
of marriage migration. Finally, we turn our attention to how marriage
migration and, especially, how the growth of so-called multicultural
families has prompted reforms to nationality laws in Japan and Korea.
I. MARRIAGE MIGRATION, NATIONHOOD, AND CITIZENSHIP
In recent years, scholars have noted the absence of sufficient
attention to explicating the relationship between gender and migration.
Further, they argue that migration is becoming increasingly feminized
as more women than ever before navigate the South-North divide in
search of better opportunities in wealthier foreign countries. 16 Migrant
women from the global South have taken on positions as factory
workers in industrial sectors, such as textiles and electronics, as
primary caregivers for children and the elderly, and as domestic
14. Kim Rahn, S. Korea to Allow Dual Citizenship from January,KOREA TIMES (Dec. 23,
2010, 7:21 PM), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/04/117

78536.html.

15. Supreme Court Finds Discrimination Against Children Born Out of Wedlock
Unconstitutional,21 WOMEN'S ASIA 32, 32 (2008).
16. See generally STEPHEN CASTLES & MARK J. MILLER, THE AGE OF MIGRATION (4th
ed. 2009); INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION OF WOMEN (Andrew R. Morrison et al. eds., 2008);
ELEONORE KOFMAN, GENDER AND INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IN EUROPE (2000);
Katharine M. Donato et al., A Glass HalfFull? Gender in Migration Studies, 40 INTIL MIG.
REV. 3, 3 (2006).
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workers in the private homes of upper- and middle-class families in
regions as far as the Middle East, Western Europe, and Southeast and
East Asia. With the feminization of migration, scholars and activists
have brought attention to the growing prevalence of sex trafficking and
prostitution as many migrant women are lured and oftentimes forced
against their wills into laboring in the sex industries. Finally, the next
stage of research on gendered migration focuses on female migration as
reproductive labor in the roles of wives and mothers.
Studies of migrant women demonstrate the eclectic ways in which
migration is gendered.' 7 The largest body of literature on female
migration focuses on the gendered, structural, and individual causal
factors behind the processes of migration, as well as work-related
concerns specific to female migrant workers, such as maternity leave
and low wages. This literature tends to center on the industries
dominated by female workers, such as domestic work, care work, and
sex work. 18 The second body of literature problematizes the links
between female migration and sex trafficking, violence, and abuse
against migrant women.' 9 The topics addressed in these studies range
from the link between domestic work and sexual abuse by employers, to
migrant factory workers who are trapped into prostitution rings, to
grassroots women's movements mobilized around the prevention of
violence against women.
The smallest, but growing, body of scholarship on female migration
concerns the phenomenon of international and transnational marriage,
17. See generally WOMEN, GENDER AND LABOUR MIGRATION: HISTORICAL AND GLOBAL

PERSPECTIVES (Pamela Sharpe ed., 2001) (considering women's varied experiences with
migration, including those in Europe, Australia, Japan, South Africa, and Latin America);
WIFE OR WORKER?: ASIAN WOMEN AND MIGRATION (Nicola Piper & Mina Roces eds., 2003)
(demonstrating the linkages between marriage, work, and relocation in the migration of
Asian women).
18. See generally ELIZABETH BERNSTEIN, TEMPORARILY YOURS: INTIMACY,
AUTHENTICITY, AND THE COMMERCE OF SEX (2007) (exploring the changing landscape of
sex work and the blurred boundaries between intimacy and commercial sex); GLOBAL SEX
WORKERS: RIGHTS, RESISTANCE, AND REDEFINITION (Kamala Kempadoo & Jo Doezema
eds., 1998) (examining the experiences of sex workers from the developing world, with a
focus on grassroots movements by sex workers, as well as the health issues many sex
workers face); RHACEL SALAZAR PARRENAS, SERVANTS OF GLOBALIZATION: WOMEN,
MIGRATION AND DOMESTIC WORK (2001) (tracing the life experiences of migrant Filipina
domestic workers at the local, transnational, and global levels).
19. See generally ANNA M. AGATHANGELOU, THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SEX:
DESIRE, VIOLENCE AND INSECURITY IN MEDITERRANEAN NATION STATES (2004) (placing the
commodification of sex in the broader global political economy as linked to the position of
peripheral states vis-A-vis larger powers); VIDYAMALI SAMARASINGHE, FEMALE SEX
TRAFFICKING IN ASIA: THE RESILIENCE OF PATRIARCHY IN A CHANGING WORLD 39-58 (2008)
(critiquing the continued existence of patriarchic social structures as a main driver of
large-scale sex trafficking in Nepal, Cambodia, and the Philippines).
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whereby women from underdeveloped countries are recruited by
individual and local actors to marry men from wealthier countries, often
of different ethnic origin. 20 The push-and-pull factors of this type of
migration are manifold: closed-door immigration policies of East Asian
countries where marriage is one of the limited routes to legitimate
migration, stark regional economic disparities, the downward
demographic pressures of advanced industrial countries, a booming and
minimally regulated international marriage brokerage industry, the
implicit or explicit acquiescence and participation of national and local
governments, as well as deep-seated patriarchic values toward
marriage.
The dominant debate in the scholarly literature on marriage
migration centers on the relationship between marriage and labor. One
side of the argument states that marriage-based migration should be
considered a form of labor migration, while the other argues that
marriage migration is singularly distinct from labor migration, as it
involves intangible factors such as love and romance. 21 Such a debate
speaks to a broader debate about the role of women's agency in the
migratory process and the question of whether migration for a majority
of women is a choice or forced upon them by myriad economic and social
circumstances. 22 However, this focus on the relationship between
marriage and work obscures the link between family membership and
national membership, as acquired through marriage. In other words,
the literature has under-examined how marriage migration intersects
with conceptions of family, nationhood, and membership.
Building on recent scholarship on transnational marriages and
gendered migration, this Article proposes that marriage migration and
the subsequent emergence of so-called multicultural families (foreign
spouses and their bicultural children) have disrupted existing
understandings of nationhood, citizenship, and race and ethnicity that
have long been associated with the family unit in putatively
homogenous societies. Unlike migrant labor, immigrants who enter a
country as spouses of nationals are necessarily permanent settlers who
must be incorporated into both a given family unit and the larger
receiving society. Because their permanent settlement involves not only
20. See generally CROSS-BORDER MARRIAGES: GENDER AND MOBILITY IN
TRANSNATIONAL ASIA (Nicole Constable ed., 2005) (presenting a cross-regional survey of
international marriages, which includes discussion on how some use the institution of
marriage as an economic opportunity); MARRIAGE, MIGRATION, AND GENDER (Rajni
Palriwala & Patricia Uberoi eds., 2008) (examining how marriage strategies facilitate
transnational migration, as well as the fluid boundaries between matchmaking and
trafficking).
21. MARRIAGE, MIGRATION, AND GENDER, supra note 20, at 34.
22. Id.
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the incorporation of individual migrant adults but also the formation of
family units that fit neither the 'foreign" nor "single-blood native"
categories, they problematize long-held conceptions of both familial and
national membership based on blood-purity and descent.
Grassroots efforts to redefine national and social membership
combined with state policies aimed at maintaining social cohesion have
produced "multicultural" discourses and policies in Japan and Korea. 23
Although both countries employ the same set of Chinese characters in
their respective translations for the term "multiculturalism," 24 their
divergent symbolic significance and applications offer an important
window into the distinct approaches taken by each country in managing
diversity. Whereas "multicultural society" in Korea signifies a
broadened definition of Korean national identity to include specific
categories of non-Korean immigrants, "multicultural coexistence" in
Japan has further narrowed conceptions of Japanese national identity,
separating ethnic Japanese (Nikkei) foreigners from "mixed-blood"
nationals.
A. Patternsof Immigration to Japan
Japan's immigration history can be divided broadly into three
categories: (1) colonial migration from the early twentieth century to the
immediate post-World War II period, (2) refugee and "skilled" migration
in the late 1970s to early 1980s, and (3) unskilled labor migration from
Asia and Latin America from the late 1980s to the present. 25 Although
Japanese employers and officials played important roles in recruiting
immigrants-forcibly for a subsection of colonial migrants from 1939Japan's borders were officially open only for the first wave of
immigration when Japan was a colonial power with territories that
included Formosa, Korea, southern Sakhalin Island, the Kwantung
Leased Territory on the Liaotung peninsula, and Japanese mandate
islands of Micronesia. 26 By the end of World War II, more than two
million colonial subjects, primarily from the Korean peninsula, were

23. Erin Aeran Chung, Korea and Japan's Multicultural Models for Immigrant
Incorporation,41 KOR. OBS. 649, 650 (2010) [hereinafter Korea and Japan'sMulticultural

Models for ImmigrantIncorporation].
24. SC{ literally means "multiple or many cultures."
25. See generally ERIN AERAN CHUNG, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN JAPAN 144-54
(2010); HIROSHI KOMAI, MIGRANT WORKERS IN JAPAN 15-22 (Jens Wilkinson trans., Kegan
Paul Int'l Ltd. 1995) (1993); YOKO SELLEK, MIGRANT LABOUR IN JAPAN (2001).

26. Edward I-te Chen, The Attempt to Integrate the Empire: Legal Perspectives, in THE
JAPANESE COLONIAL EMPIRE, 1895-1945, at 241 (Ramon H. Myers & Mark R. Peattie eds.,
1984).
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residing in Japan. 27 Approximately two-thirds of this population was
repatriated during the process of decolonization, and by the end of the
American Occupation of Japan in 1952, Japan implemented strict
immigration and border controls to prevent the mass influx of former
colonial subjects. 28 Yet, in spite of these controls, with unstable
conditions in the Korean peninsula following Korea's liberation from
Japan in 1945 and escalating to the Korean War in 1950, illegal
immigration to Japan, largely by former repatriates to the Korean
peninsula, became a formidable problem during this period, as Tessa
Morris-Suzuki documented in a path-breaking study of this first wave of
immigration. 29 Nevertheless, less than 700,000 foreigners resided in
Japan by the end of the occupation in 1952.30
Between the end of World War II and the 1960s, Japan's emigrant
population well exceeded its immigrant population, with over two
million Japanese migrants settled in North and South America and, to a
lesser extent, in Japan's former colonies in Asia.3 ' Indeed, it- was not
until 1974 that the Japan Emigration Service, a semiofficial
organization affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that
managed the recruitment and promotion of emigration to Latin
America, was replaced by the Japan International Cooperation Agency,
marking the dissolution of Japan's official emigration programs to Latin
America. 32 Although Japan experienced labor shortages in the 1960s
similar to those in other industrialized countries, Japanese officials and
corporations did not import foreign labor, opting instead to automate
production, shift production abroad, and tap into alternative sources of

27. MARK E. CAPRIO, JAPANESE ASSIMILATION POLICIES IN COLONIAL KOREA: 19101945, at 93 (2009).
28. See generally TESSA MORRIS-SUZUKI, BORDERLINE JAPAN: FRONTIER CONTROLS,
FOREIGNERS AND FRONTIER CONTROLS IN THE POSTWAR ERA (2010) (reinterpreting
postwar Japanese immigration policies, in which the Cold War context is critical in
explaining Korean migration in and out of Japan during the postwar period).
29. Id.
30. See YOSHIO MORITA, SUJI GA KATARU ZAINICHI KANKOKU CHOSENJIN NO REKISHI
[HISTORY OF KOREAN RESIDENTS IN JAPAN THROUGH STATISTICS] (1996).

31. Recommendations of Overseas Emigration Council Future Policy Regarding
Cooperation with Overseas Communities of Nikkei, MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. JAPAN (Dec.
11, 2000), http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/emigration/Nikkei.html; MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF JAPAN, ANNUAL REPORT OF STATISTICS ON JAPANESE NATIONALS OVERSEAS
(2010), available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/toko/tokei/hojin/10/pdfs/1.pdf.
32. History, JAPAN INT'L COOPERATION AGENCY, http://www.jica.go.jplenglishlabout
history/index.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2012); Section 5: One-Hundred Years of Governmentendorsed Emigration, Diplomatic Bluebook 1985, MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. JAPAN,
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1985/1985-3-5.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
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domestic labor such as women, students, the elderly, and rural
migrants. 33
The second wave of immigration in the 1970s to early 1980s,
therefore, did not represent responses to labor shortages. Rather, this
wave was made up largely of three unrelated groups. The first and
largest group consisted primarily of women from the Philippines,
Thailand, South Korea, and Taiwan who were recruited to Japan as
"skilled" workers to fill the demand in the so-called entertainment
industry. 34 The number of immigrants with "entertainer" visas jumped
from almost 6,000 in 1975 to over 34,000 in 1985 and over 75,000 in
1990.35 Most "entertainers" continue to be recruited to work as hostesses
in the industry known in Japan as mizu shabai (water trade, in
reference to bars, cabarets, restaurants, and so forth) and as
prostitutes. 36 Other "skilled" workers residing in Japan during this
period were generally white-collar professionals, many of them from the
United States and Europe. 37 The children and grandchildren of
Japanese citizens who remained in Japan's former colonies, mostly
China, made up the second group. Although ethnically Japanese and
recognized as Japanese nationals, this relatively small group of
"returnees" encountered significant problems of adjustment and
discrimination, similar to non-Japanese immigrants.3 8 Finally, refugees
from Indochina made up the third group, with more than 10,000
entering Japan with temporary visas between 1979 and 1999.39 It
should be noted, however, that the Ministry of Justice recognized only a
total of 315 refugees out of 3,118 applications between 1981, when
33. See Korea and Japan's Multicultural Models for Immigrant Incorporation, supra
note 23, at 662.
34. CHUNG, supranote 25, at 149-50.
35. HistoricalStatistics of Japan,supra note 7.
36. See SELLEK, supra note 25, at 37-38, 160-61. In 1988, the Ministry of Justice
revised the application procedures for "entertainer" visas to prevent the entry of
"entertainers" whose actual work was in the mizu shabai and sex industries. See KOMAI,
supranote 25.
37. Historical Statistics of Japan, supra note 7; see also Registered Aliens by
Nationality and Status of Residence (Permanent Resident, Non-permanent Residents)
(1948-2009), MINISTRY INTERNAL AFF. & COMMUNIc'Ns, http://www.stat.go.jp/english/
datalchoukil02.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2012) (follow 2-12 "Registered Aliens by
Nationality and Status of Residence" hyperlink).
38. JOHN DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT: JAPAN IN THE WAKE OF WORLD WAR II, at 48-64
(1999); Roger Goodman, The Changing Perception and Status of Japan's Returnee
Children (Kikokushijo), in GLOBAL JAPAN: THE EXPERIENCE OF JAPAN'S NEW IMMIGRANTS
AND OVERSEAS COMMUNITIES (Roger Goodman et al. eds., 2003).
39. See Takahashi Koichi, Nanmin mondai ni taisuru nihon no torikumi [Japan's
Approach to the Refugee Problem], KOKUSAI MONDAI, Dec. 2002, at 52 (2002); Refugees,
MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. JAPAN, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/refugee/japan.html (last
visited Feb. 20, 2012).
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Japan ratified the United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees, and 2004.40
By the 1980s, when Japan experienced a second labor shortage,
internal sources of labor had been depleted and rising land prices in
urban areas triggered a reverse migration to surrounding suburbs. 41
Furthermore, the expansion of private brokers and intermediaries in
Japan and various sending countries actively organized and promoted
labor migration to Japan. From the late 1980s, large numbers of foreign
workers entered Japan with tourist visas and overstayed their threemonth limit, establishing a substantial population of undocumented
immigrants that grew to a high of 300,000 by 1993.42
In an effort to combat illegal immigration and, at the same time,
meet labor demands, the government revised the Immigration Control
and Refugee Recognition Act in 1990, setting the foundation for Japan's
third wave of immigration. In addition to imposing criminal penalties to
employers knowingly hiring undocumented workers, the revision
reorganized and expanded visa categories from eighteen to twentyseven. 43 The most significant of these is the "long-term resident" visa
granted exclusively to descendants of Japanese emigrants (Nikkei), up
until the third generation, and their families, which allows for
unrestricted economic activities. Only four other visa categories permit
unrestricted economic activities: special permanent resident, permanent
resident, spouse or child of a Japanese national, and spouse or child of a
permanent resident. 44 Although Japan's borders officially remain closed
to unskilled labor, the revision further allows precollege and college
students as well as "trainees" to work for a limited amount of time.4 5
It was during this last wave of immigration that international
marriages began to rise significantly in Japan. Although the vast
majority of migrant labor to Japan from the late 1980s was male,
40. Petrice R. Flowers, Failureto Protect Refugees? Domestic Institutions,International
Organizations,and Civil Society in Japan, 34 J. JAPANESE STUD. 333, 340 (2008).
41. See MORI HIROMI, IMMIGRATION POLICY AND FOREIGN WORKERS IN JAPAN 56 (1997).
42. Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev. [OECD], International Migration Outlook:
SOPEMI 2011, at 294 (2011).
43. The revision, modeled after U.S. immigration laws, made employers who hired
undocumented workers and brokers who facilitated their employment subject to a
maximum three years imprisonment and fines up to two million yen. See KOMAI, supra
note 25, at 5-6.
44. See generally Takeyuki Tsuda & Wayne A. Cornelius, Japan: Government Policy,
Immigrant Reality, in CONTROLLING IMMIGRATION: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 439, 439
(Wayne A. Cornelius et al. eds., 2004).
45. Shutsu ny-ikoku kanri oyobi nanmin ninteih5 daishichij5 daiichik5 dainig6 no kijun wo
sadameru shorei [Immigration Control & Refugee Recognition Act], Law No. 79 of 2009,
Appended Table 1(3) & (4) (Japan), available at http/www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/
law/detail/9id=1934&vm=&re=.
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women from Asian countries came to Japan during this period to fill
another shortage: the "bride famine" in rural areas. Some municipal
governments of depopulated rural communities recruited so-called
migrant brides, largely from the Philippines, China, Taiwan, and Korea,
through arranged meetings (miai), miai tours in the sending countries,
collaborative arrangements with private brokers, or, in the case of the
earliest groups of Filipina brides known as hanayome, bilateral
agreements. 46 From 1975, international marriages involving Japanese
men and non-Japanese women began to outnumber those involving
Japanese women and non-Japanese men and, among the former, the
number of marriages involving Filipina women rose from less than 10
percent in 1990 to over 30 percent in 1995.47 Between 1970 and 2000,
the number of international marriages jumped from 0.5 percent of all
marriages in Japan to more than 4.5 percent.4 8
B. Patternsof Immigration to Korea
Korea's immigration history can also be divided into three phases:
(1) unofficial, unskilled labor migration from China, South Asia, and
Southeast Asia from the late 1980s; (2) officially sanctioned foreign
labor migration of predominantly male migrant workers during the
1990s through the Industrial Trainee Program (1993) and the
Employment Permit System (EPS) (2004) thereafter; and (3) female
marriage migration of foreign women who have been immigrating to
Korea for the purpose of marriage since the 2000s. 49
Before the first wave of immigration began, Korea was historically a
country of emigration, where migration outflows outpaced inflows. The
only significant foreign population settled in Korea until this time were
Taiwanese nationals known as hwagyo (or huaqiao in Chinese) whose
roots in Korea date back to 1882 when Korea and China signed a trade
agreement permitting Chinese merchants to own and lease land in

46. Suzuki, supra note 12, at 399, 403-04; WOLFGANG HERBERT, FOREIGN WORKERS
AND LAw ENFORCEMENT IN JAPAN 34-36 (1996).

47. Gavin Jones & Hsiu-hua Shen, InternationalMarriage in East and Southeast Asia:
Trends and Research Emphases, 12 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 9, 12 (2008); Fumiteru Nitta,
Kokusai Kekkon: Trends in InterculturalMarriage in Japan, 12 INT'L J. INTERCULTURAL
REL. 205, 205 (1988).

48. Vital Statistics of Japan,supranote 13.
49. See generally Timothy Lim, Racing from The Bottom in South Korea?: The Nexus
Between Civil Society and TransnationalMigrants, 43 ASIAN SURV. 423 (2003) (examining
the history of transnational labor migration in South Korea); see also Lee, supra note 8
(analyzing the historical evolution of international marriages in South Korea).
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Korea's treaty ports.50 During the Japanese colonial period (1910-45),
floods of Korean emigrants left for Japan and Manchuria often as
conscripted labor, students, and independence fighters.5 1 Although it
was not official emigration policy, in the 1960s and 1970s, smaller
numbers of Koreans left for the United States, Germany, and the
Middle East, mostly as students and guest workers, especially nurses
and miners in the case of Germany, and as construction workers to the
Middle East. 52 By the late 1980s, foreigners in Korea consisted largely of
native-born Chinese residents (hwagyo), foreign spouses of Korean
nationals (mostly men from the United States due to long-term U.S.
military presence), and a smaller contingent of white-collar
professionals.5 3
In the late 1980s, the Korean economy began to experience acute
labor shortages across many of its industries, especially in the
manufacturing, production, and services sectors. To address these
shortages on an as-needed basis, foreign workers were unofficially
permitted to enter through a "wink-and-nod" approach made possible in
part by the lobbying of the powerful Korean Federation of Small
Businesses, where Korean authorities implicitly turned a blind eye to
foreign workers who entered on tourist visas in order to seek
employment and overstayed.54 During this time, official immigration
policy only sanctioned the migration of high-skilled labor. The 1988
Seoul Summer Olympics signaled a turning point when Korea first
began to experience significant inflows of foreign labor, especially due to
increased demand for labor in the construction-related sectors.5 5 The
result was an increase in the number of undocumented workers that
grew steadily between 1991 and 2001.56 By 1991, less than five years
after the institution of democratic reforms on June 29, 1987, more than

50. Chulwoo Lee, 'Us' and 'Them' in Korean Law: The Creation, Accommodation and
Exclusion of Outsiders in South Korea, in EAST ASIAN LAW: UNIVERSAL NoRMs AND LOcAL
CULTURES 106, 120 (Arthur Rosett et al. eds., 2002).
51. JOHN LIE, ZAINICHI (KOREANS IN JAPAN): DIASPORIC NATIONALISM AND
POSTCOLONIAL IDENTITY 4 (1993).
52. ASIA PACIFIC MIGRATION RESEARCH NETWORK (APMRN), MIGRATION ISSUES IN
THE ASIA PACIFIC: ISSUES PAPER FROM THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH KOREA (1997), available
at http://www.unesco.org/most/apmrnwl2.htm.
53. Lim, supra note 49, at 426.

54. See Timothy C. Lim, Will South Korea Follow the German Experience? Democracy,
the Migratory Process, and the Prospects for Permanent Immigration in Korea, 32 KOR.
STUD. 28, 33-36 (2008).
55. Lim, supra note 49, at 426.
56. Id. at 429.
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45,000 migrant workers had entered Korea, an explosive increase from
the previous decade.5 7
In response to the growing undocumented population, the Korean
government instituted the Industrial and Technical Training System
(ITTP), similar to the Japanese counterpart, the Industrial Trainee
Program, which was intended to provide a government-administered
system for overseeing and controlling the migration of unskilled foreign
labor. 8 Yet, the ITTP was criticized by civic activist groups because it
denied foreign migrant workers the basic rights of Korea's tripartite
labor laws: the rights of unionizing, collective bargaining, and protest.5 9
The second problem posed by the ITTP was the institutionalization of
low wages, below that of minimum wage.6 0 Finally, by posing a one-year
limit on the period of sojourn, the unintended consequence of the ITTP
program was a significant increase in the number of undocumented
workers. Despite reduced inflows of migrant workers during the 1997
Asian Financial Crisis and its immediate aftermath, foreign workers
continued to arrive in Korea in ever-increasing numbers. Designed by
migration experts, the EPS, which eventually replaced the ITTP
(phased out in 2007), was introduced with great fanfare in 2004.
Through the EPS, the Korean government grants basic labor rights,
including pensions and health insurance to foreign workers, a standard
that is on par with those granted to Korean workers as stipulated in the
Labor Standard Act. 61 The significance of this system was that it far
exceeded the rights extended to foreign residents and workers in other
industrialized countries.
The Korean government initially viewed the EPS as a long-term
solution to labor shortages among the country's small and medium sized
enterprises. 62 The EPS, however, limits foreign workers to employment
in only five industries: manufacturing, construction, agriculture and
stockbreeding, fishing, and services. Further, it is only available to
migrants from countries that have signed a bilateral agreement with
Korea, such as the Philippines, Nepal, and Vietnam, among others. 63 At
present, the maximum stay allotted by the visas (H-2 "working-visit" or
E-9 "non-professional employment") issued under the EPS is five years,
57. See Erin Aeran Chung, Workers or Residents? Diverging Patterns of Immigrant
Incorporationin Korea and Japan, 83 PAc. AFF. 675, 685 (2010).

58. Dong-Hoon Seol, Past and Present of Foreign Workers in Korea 1987-2000, 2 ASIA
SOLIDARITY Q., no. 2, 2000, at 6.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Legal Rights, EMP. PERMIT SYS. (2010), http://www.eps.go.kr/en/duty/duty-01.jsp.
62. See Lim, supra note 54, at 35.
63. 4 Major Social Insurance, EMP. PERMIT SYS. (2010), http://www.eps.go.kr/en/duty/
duty-03.jsp.
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but it remains contingent on whether workers are able to receive an
extension of employment, which is largely the purview of the individual
employers. 64 Furthermore, foreign workers, including those hired
through EPS, continue to face problems, such as nonpayment or late
payment of wages, mistreatment, and abuse by employers.
Until the growing prevalence of international marriages in the mid2000s, the vast majority of migrant labor to Korea was and continues to
be male, although more female migrant labor has arrived as domestic
workers and caregivers in recent years.65 Concurrent to labor shortages,
Korea experienced a noted dearth of rural brides as marriage and
fertility rates plummeted to the lowest among OECD countries.
International marriage in Korea can be characterized by two stages: the
first occurred during the early 1990s and involved mostly Chosunjok
women, while the second has diversified both in its demographic and
geographic composition.66
In the first wave, marriages were arranged between farmers and
Chosunjok women through introductions by local governments,
assemblies, and agricultural associations.6 7 From 1990 to 1999, there
were 55,627 international marriages involving foreign wives and
Korean husbands; of those, 37,171 were from China, most of them
Chosunjok.68 Due to their resemblance to native Koreans, the early
Chosunjok marriage migrants did not receive much widespread public
attention, except for the increased incident of sham marriages among
Chosunjok-Korean marriages.69
The second wave of marriage migration occurred after 2002, driven
by the rise of commercialized international marriage agencies and the
lack of government oversight over them, especially those that were
located overseas. 70 International marriages between foreign women and
Korean men reached a peak in 2005, when they represented nearly
fourteen percent of all marriages that took place that year. 71 From 2001
to 2009, the total number of marriage migrants in Korea grew nearly

64. Chung, supranote 57, at 685.

65. Hye-Kyung Lee, Gender, Migration and Civil Activism in South Korea, 12 ASIAN &
PAC. MIGRATION J. 127, 148-49 (2003).
66. Lee, supra note 8, at 110-11.
67. Id. at 111.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 114.
70. Id. at 112.
71. KOREA IMMIGR. SERV., FIRST BASIC PLAN FOR IMMIGRATION POLICY: 2008-2012, at
45 (2009), available at http://www.scribd.com/docl26660376/The-First-Basic-Plan-forImmigration-Policy-2008-2012-Ministry-of-Justice-Republic-of-Korea.
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five-fold from 25,182 to 125,087, where nearly 88 percent were women. 72
At the end of 2010, the Korean government reported 141,654 marriage
migrants residing in Korea.73
II. REFORMING BLOOD-BASED NATIONAL MEMBERSHIP INJAPAN AND
KOREA
Japan and Korea share similarities in patterns of immigration,
driven by analogous demographic and economic trends and comprised of
successive waves of coethnic and mostly unskilled laborers from Asia.
Both countries have attempted to keep unskilled labor out despite
sustained labor shortages, using "side door" practices to meet labor and
demographic demands.7 4 In recent years, however, the Japanese and
Korean governments passed unprecedented revisions to their respective
nationality laws: the 2008 Supreme Court decision to grant Japanese
nationality to children born out of wedlock to a foreign mother and
Japanese father in Japan and the 2010 multiple-nationality bill passed
by the National Assembly, which permits dual nationality for marriage
migrants, among other foreign groups.7 5 These revisions represent both
states' attempts to incorporate multicultural families into the polity by
divorcing nationality from monocultural ideology. Despite these
convergences, however, the government responses to reforming bloodbased national membership have diverged in scope and in magnitude,
reflecting different conceptions of and orientations toward
multiculturalism and diversity.
A. Mixed-Blood Nationals and Ethnic JapaneseForeignersin Japan
Since the enactment of the Nationality Law in 1950, there have
been no major changes to citizenship attribution criteria in Japan
except for two pertaining to bicultural children: the 1984 and 2008
revisions. With the 1984 revision of the Nationality Law following
Japan's ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of

72. CHULIPGUK OEGUKIN-JEONGCHAEK TONGGYAE-YEONBO [ANNUAL STATISTICAL
REPORT FOR POLICIES ON IMMIGRATION AND FOREIGNERS], supra note 7, at 695-96.

73. Id. at 24.
74. Tsuda & Cornelius, supra note 44, at 452-57.
75. Saik5 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 4, 2008, 2006 (Gyo-Tsu) no. 135, 62
http://www.courts.go.jp/englishljudgments/text/2008.06.04-2006.-Gyo-Tsu-.No.. 135111255.html (Japan); Gukjeok beob [Nationality Act], Act. No. 8892, Mar. 14, 2008, amended
by Act. No. 10275, May 4, 2010 (S. Kor.), available at http://likms.assembly.go.kr/law/
jsp/lawlLawThree.jsp?WORKTYPE-LAWTHREE&LAWID=Al295&PROMNO=10275&
PROMDT-20100504.
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Discrimination against Women, children of international marriages are
eligible to gain Japanese nationality either through their father or
mother's nationality.76 Until 2008, however, children born out of
wedlock to a foreign mother and Japanese father could not gain
Japanese nationality automatically unless paternity could be
determined at the time of the child's birth.7 7 This condition posed a
problem for a significant fraction of bicultural children in Japan.
Although international marriages between native Japanese men and
foreign women from the 1980s resulted in the birth of numerous
bicultural children eligible for Japanese nationality, extramarital sexual
liaisons and divorces created a growing population of bicultural children
without Japanese nationality. The latter population was largely the
product of the second wave of immigration to Japan, specifically, female
migrants who entered Japan as "entertainers" and their encounters
with Japanese men both on and off the job. Unlike Korea, divorce rates
in Japan surpassed marriage rates between international couples by the
time that the landmark 2008 court case forced the government to revise
the Nationality Law.78
Similar to the circumstances of the earlier 1984 revision to the
Nationality Law, the primary problem of the 2008 case centered on the
unfair application of jus sanguinis, as opposed to the liberalization of
the Nationality Law (to include elements of jus soli). 79 The ten plaintiffs
in the case were born out of wedlock to Filipino mothers and Japanese
fathers who had acknowledged their paternity after the children were
born. As Nobue Suzuki details in her rich ethnographic study of the
plaintiffs in the case, Japan's Nationality Law had, until 2008, applied a
"fetus recognition" (taiji ninchi) system to children born out of wedlock
that required Japanese fathers to acknowledge their paternity while the
children were fetuses. 0 On June 4, 2008, the Supreme Court ruled the
marriage and legitimation requirements for Japanese nationality
discriminatory and unconstitutional, prompting the aforementioned
revision to the Nationality Law.81
76. Koku seki h5 [The Nationality Law], Law No. 147 of 1950, art. 2, para. 1 (Japan),
amended by Law No. 268 of 1952, Law No. 45 of 1984, Law No. 89 of 1993, Law No. 147 of
2004, Law No. 88 of 2008); Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.

77. Nobue Suzuki, Outlawed Children:JapaneseFilipino Children,Legal Defiance and
Ambivalent Citizenships, 83 PAc. AFF. 37, 43-44 (2010).
78. Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 4, 2008, 2006 (Gyo-Tsu) no. 135, 62 SAIKO
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSHO], supranote 75.
79. Id.
80. Suzuki, supra note 77, at 31, 37.
81. Saik5 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 4, 2008, 2006 (Gyo-Tsu) no. 135, 62 SAIKO
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHU [MINSH0], supra note 75.
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The 2008 Supreme Court ruling was significant because it applied
the nondiscrimination principle to the nationality issue, thereby
expanding eligibility for Japanese nationality to not only those born to
married couples or, at the very least, a Japanese mother, but also to
those who could demonstrate evidence of a direct blood connection to a
Japanese national. 82 Combined with the 1984 revision, this reform
fundamentally challenged Japanese nationality laws that were based on
ethnic purity, patrilineal descent, and the institution of marriage. The
1984 and 2008 reforms to the Nationality Law highlighted the need to
adjust the laws for those with "mixed" blood, specifically those without
Japanese fathers in the first instance and those born out of wedlock in
the second.
It should be noted, however, that the Nationality Law was not
revised to allow ethnic Japanese (Nikkei) immigrants automatic, or at
least simplified, access to Japanese nationality. On the contrary, the
two reforms, inadvertently perhaps, widen the gap between foreigners
and Japanese nationals, regardless of blood ties, and further constrict
the definition of Japanese national identity. While opening up the
possibility for a multiethnic conception of Japanese nationality, the
reforms, which were directed at children of Japanese nationals, make
the link between consanguinity and nationality more literal by making
the passive transmittal of blood the basis for granting Japanese
nationality.
Because blood ties alone do not guarantee Japanese nationality for
coethnic immigrants, however, the application of descent to nationality
remains limited and inconsistent. In Japan, Nikkei immigrants
constitute a special category of foreigners who, unlike most immigrants,
automatically qualify for visas that allow for unrestricted economic
activities and continued residence in Japan for up to three years, which
they can renew an indefinite number of times. While their Japanese
descent makes Nikkei immigrants the exception to Japan's otherwise
closed-door immigration policies, it does not give them clear pathways to
Japanese citizenship. Like all other foreigners, ethnic Japanese
immigrants must undergo the process of naturalization in order to
become Japanese nationals.
The -ways that the Nikkei have been incorporated into public
debates on Japan's "multicultural" society, moreover, privilege
nationality over ethnicity. Since the late 1990s, local governments,
NGOs, the Japanese media, and even some bureaucrats and politicians
have made references to Japan's "multicultural" society.8 3 In 2006, the
82. Id.

83. See Roger Pulvers, Barriersto MulticulturalismAre as Low as They've Ever Been in
Japan,JAPAN TIMES (Aug. 14, 2011), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/fl2011O814rp.html.
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Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) announced
Japan's first comprehensive framework for immigrant incorporation in
the form of a "multicultural coexistence" (tabunka ky6sei) promotion
plan that calls for all of Japan's prefectures and major cities to devise
plans for "multicultural community building."8 The guidelines provided
in the MIC plan focus on four broad tasks: support for intercultural
communication, assistance in everyday life, the development of a
"multicultural coexistence" community, and promotion of "multicultural
coexistence" policies.85 Local governments with relatively large
proportions of foreign residents in their communities have undertaken
these tasks by publishing multilingual pamphlets, providing Japanese
language classes, offering free legal counseling, and holding
"multicultural" events and festivals, among other things.86
In communities with relatively large numbers of Latin American
residents, Nikkei immigrants have been at the center of debates on the
dangers or benefits of Japan's growing social diversity based not on
their ethnicities but on their Brazilian or Peruvian nationalities.8 7
"Multicultural" events and festivals in such communities often entail
the celebration of "Latin" culture with Nikkei immigrants at the center,
such as the annual samba carnival in Oizumi City, a small industrial
town in Gumma Prefecture where over 10 percent of the population is
Brazilian.88 Such "multicultural" celebrations highlight how distinct
Japanese nationals are even from other ethnic Japanese. As one Nikkei
Brazilian recounts:
So my friends [in Brazil] used to call me china. My
nickname was china. I mean, I grew up like that ...
[hearing] China, china . . . [China] is not Brazilian

right? The impression you have is that you're never
going to be Brazilian by your appearance. And once you
84. Ministry of Internal Aff. & Communic'ns, Tabunka kydsei suisin puroguramu
[Multicultural Coexistence Promotion in Local Communities] (2006).
85. Chung, supra note 23, at 684.

86. See generally Kashiwazaki Chikako, Local Government and Resident Foreigners:A
Changing Relationship, in JAPAN's ROAD TO PLURALISM: TRANSFORMING LOCAL
COMMUNITIES IN THE GLOBAL ERA 63 (Furukawa Shun'ichi & Menju Toshihiro eds., 2002).

87. See Norimitsu Onishi, An Enclave of Brazilians Is Testing Insular Japan, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 2, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/02/world/asial 02japan.html?pagewanted=all;
see generally TAKEYUIG TsuDA, STRANGERS IN THE ETHNIC HOMELAND: JAPANESE BRAZILIAN
RETURN MIGRATION IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (2003).
88. Yasuda Naoko, Brazilian Community at Oizumi in Japan, ALT. VIEWS (Aug. 10,
2007), http://en.pare-jp.org/news/features/multiculturaLsociety/sub/brazilian-communityat-oizumi-in-japan; see also Daniela de Carvalho, Nikkei Communities in Japan, in
GLOBAL JAPAN: THE EXPERIENCE OF JAPAN'S NEW IMMIGRANTS AND OVERSEAS
COMMUNITIES 195 (Roger Goodman et al. eds., 2003).
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arrive in Japan,
89
(burajirujin).

well

[you're

called]

Brazilian

What is striking about "multicultural coexistence" programs and
discourse in Japan is the absence of multiethnic Japanese individuals
and families. The fact that naturalized citizens of foreign descent and
bicultural children do not figure prominently in Japan's version of
"multiculturalism" underlines the degree to which Japan's multiethnic
population, including both new and old immigrant groups, remains
disaggregated from Japan's nationality-based multicultural discourse.
Moreover, the contrasting approaches to incorporating "multiethnic
children" as Japanese nationals, on the one hand, and ethnic Japanese
foreigners as part of Japan's "multicultural society," on the other,
highlights the ways that blood, nationality, and citizenship are
increasingly becoming disaggregated in Japan.
B. Targeted Multiculturalismand MulticulturalFamilies in Korea
Since its enactment in 1948, the Korean Nationality Law has
undergone two major revisions. The first occurred in 1997 to allow
bicultural children to gain Korean nationality either through their
father or mother. Prior to the 1997 amendment, children of
international marriages were eligible to gain nationality only if their
father was a Korean national.9 0 The second major revision took place in
April 2010, when the National Assembly reformed the Nationality Law
to allow multiple nationality (boksugukjeok).91 Under this law, the
following categories of persons are eligible to hold multiple nationalities,
under the condition that they take an oath not to exercise their rights as
a foreign national while in Korea: (1) highly skilled foreigners with
"exceptional talent" in the fields of culture and arts, athletics,
management, specialized technical expertise as evaluated by a
committee within the Ministry of Justice; (2) Koreans who gained dual
89. Interview with Anonymous, in Kawasaki, Japan (Menandro Gomes trans., July 21,
2010).
90. Lee, supra note 8, at 112-13.
91. The term "dual national" is changed to "multiple national." Gukjeok beob [Nationality
Act], Act. No. 8892, art. 4. Because of the negative connotation that it holds regarding one's
loyalty to the country, the term "dual nationality" (ijoonggukjeok) is avoided in the legal and
political discourse in Korea. Instead, the term 'multiple nationality" has been adopted. See
Duck-hwa Hong, ijunggukjeok - boksugukjeok euro bakkwin baegyeong [Context Behind the
Change from Dual Multiple Nationality, YONHAP NEWS (Sept. 2, 2009),
http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2009/09/0210200000000AKR20090902159100069.HT
ML; Kang Shin-who, Lawyers' Group Calls for Dual Nationality, KOREA TIMES (Nov. 10,
2007, 6:06 PM), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/ www/news/nation/2011/041117_11746.html.
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citizenship at birth, by being born in a country that grants birthright
citizenship, and have fulfilled military service; 92 (3) overseas Koreans
over sixty-five years of age; and (4) marriage migrants who are
presently married to a Korean national.93
The multiple-nationality bill was part of a larger set of reforms to
immigration and citizenship policies enacted since the mid-2000s in
response to the rapidly expanding foreign resident population. 94 For
many years, Korean policymakers had debated the idea of introducing
dual nationality, particularly since the passage of the Overseas Korean
Act in 1999, which grants employment and other quasi-dual citizenship
rights to certain groups in the Korean diaspora.95 The greatest hurdle
facing the acceptance of dual nationality had been the issue of military
conscription, one of the most politicized obligations of Korean
citizenship for men, and related concerns that too many people would
invoke foreign citizenship in order to evade military service. Several
high-profile cases of draft evasion by the sons of celebrities and of the
political elite who claimed foreign citizenship made dual nationality a
tricky political issue that few politicians were willing to address.
Growing concerns about demographic trends, the need to more
aggressively recruit attractive immigrants, and the social problems
facing multicultural families, however, prompted officials and
policymakers to rekindle the debate on dual and multiple nationality in

92. Koreans who lost their citizenship by acquiring a foreign one are eligible to
reacquire their citizenship, provided (in the case of men) that they have fulfilled military
duty. Dual Citizenship is the Way of the Future, CHOSUNILBO (Oct. 20, 2009, 1:08 PM),
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/htmLdir/2009/10/20/2009102000811.html.
93. There are some notable exclusions to the categories of eligible groups: (1) native-born
Chinese immigrants, many of whom are now third-generation and beyond; (2) marriage
migrants who have divorced and are without children born to a Korean spouse; and (3)
children who gain birthright citizenship in other countries (so-called "anchor babies) in
which their parents did not reside for more than six months. Lee Tae-hoon, Dual Citizenship
to Be Allowed, KOREA TIMES (Apr. 21, 2010, 8:02 PM), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/
www/news/nation/2011/04I116_64629.html.
94. Dual Citizenship on the Cards Again, CHOSUNILBO, (Oct. 19 2009, 12:57 PM),
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2009/10/19/2009101900824.html.
95. Initially the Overseas Korean Act did not apply to Koreans who never held South
Korean citizenship, meaning those 6migr6s and their descendants who left Korea before
1948, the year of the founding of the Republic of Korea. This stipulation essentially
excluded most ethnic Koreans from China and the former Soviet Union. In 2004, the Act
was revised to include ethnic Koreans from China, albeit with restrictions, after the
Constitutional Court ruled in 2001 that the act was discriminatory. Jung-Sun Park &
Paul Y. Chang, Contention in the Construction of a Global Korean Community: The Case of
the OverseasKorean Act, 10 J. KOR. STUD. 1, 2, 4 (2005).

216

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 19:1

2008.96 In these debates, civic activists and migrant advocacy groups
persistently pressured policymakers to include marriage migrants as an
eligible group because of the legal vulnerabilities they face as migrants
seeking naturalization.97 Despite simplified naturalization procedures
granted to marriage migrants, the entire process of acquiring Korean
nationality can take from three to six years after marriage due to
continuous residency
requirements.9 8 Between
applying
for
naturalization and acquiring citizenship, the legal status of marriage
migrants who remain on spousal visas depends on the willingness of the
husband to sponsor and verify his spouse's marital status, which must
be done annually with each visa renewal. One ethnic Korean immigrant
from China describes her frustration with having to rely on her husband
for naturalization, stating, "it's been a long time since I was eligible for
naturalization, but my husband wouldn't apply for me. And they
[immigration officials] were very suspicious of why it took me so long to
submit my papers."9 9 With growing divorce rates among international
marriages, often due to abuse and violence, many marriage migrants
and the children they have brought with them from previous marriages
have ended up stateless or undocumented, and thus, at high risk for
deportation.100

While the inclusion of marriage migrants in the multiple-nationality
bill may signal the government's acceptance of the group as desirable
immigrants, it also represents the government's attempt to manage
Korea's rapidly growing diversity by situating "multicultural families"
as the core agents and recipients of targeted incorporation policies. In
96. See Learning Times, Dual Citizenship:Government Mulls Policy Change to Prevent
Brain Drain,KOREA TIMES (Oct. 31, 2007), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/koreatime-admin/
LT/common/nview.asp?idx=645&nmode=2.
97. Initial discussion of granting dual nationality extended to highly skilled professionals
and overseas adoptees. However, in public forums hosted by the Ministry of Justice,
policymakers and civic activists raised the opinion that marriage migrants, overseas
Koreans, and Chinese-Koreans should be included as potential holders of multiple

nationality. The Ministry of Justice then conducted a public survey regarding public
attitudes toward the granting of multiple nationality to various groups. This newspaper
reports that 37.4 percent of those surveyed responded positively to marriage migrants as
holders of multiple nationality. Duck-hwa Hong, Boksugukjeok heoyong jindan [A Diagnosis
of
Multiple
Nationality],
YONHAP
NEWS
(Sept.
13,
2009),
http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2009/09/06/0200000000AKR20090906001800069.HT
ML.
98. At present, marriage migrants are required to reside in Korea for two full consecutive
years in order to be eligible to apply for naturalization. Simplified Naturalization(Marriage),
HI KOREA (Oct. 16, 2008), http://www.hikorea.go.kr/pt/InfoDetailR kr.pt.
99. Interview with Kyung-Ae Kim, in Seoul, S. Kor. (June 18, 2010).

100. In Seop Chung et al., The Treatment of Stateless Persons and the Reduction of
Statelessness: Policy Suggestions for the Republic of Korea, KOREA REV. INT'L STUD. 20-22
(2009).
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2006, the focus of immigration and immigrant integration policies
visibly shifted from migrant workers to marriage migrants when the
Roh Moo-Hyun government (2003-2008) announced the "Grand Plan," a
comprehensive policy framework aimed at the integration of marriage
migrants and the attainment of a "multicultural society."10'
There were two main reasons for the policy shift. First, the passage
of the EPS in 2003 and the successive phasing out of the ITTP mitigated
the politicization of the migrant-worker issue, providing a political
opportunity for the government to direct its attention elsewhere.
Despite the controversial aspects mentioned above, the EPS was
perceived as a compromise between migrant worker activists, who
wanted greater recognition of migrant workers' rights, and government
officials, who sought to maintain control over the migrant worker
system through strict regulations.1 02
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the advocacy efforts of civil
society actors demonstrated to policymakers that the myriad social
issues surrounding marriage migrants-high poverty rates, domestic
violence, and divorce rates-merited full and immediate attention.10
Marriage migrants were not the only concern of future-oriented
government officials; they recognized that the difficulties experienced by
mixed-blood, "multicultural" children in adapting to the Korean
educational system posed a considerable challenge to social cohesion in
the present and in the future. As a result, not only marriage migrants
and their children, but "multicultural families" (damunhwa gajeong),
have been targets of the policy spotlight as the vanguard of the new
"multiculturalism."
This "targeted multiculturalism," however, has been accompanied
by the increasingly rigid exclusion of other migrant groups-migrant
workers and ethnic return migrants, particularly from China.104 While
marriage migrants and multicultural families have been singled out as

101. The "Grand Plan" is a master policy framework for coordinating integration policies
among the major ministries, including the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family,
Justice, Labor, Social Welfare and Health, and their respective local divisions. Lee, supra
note 8, at 116. Furthermore, in the same year, the government passed two bills: the Plan
for Social Integration of Mixed-bloods and Migrants and the Plan for Social Integration of
Marriage Immigrants. These forerunners laid the groundwork for the far-reaching Basic
Act on the Treatment of Foreigners in Korea in 2007. This Act set distinct guidelines for
integrating marriage migrants into society, among other categories of immigrant
populations, such as overseas Koreans and migrant workers. Chung, supra note 23, at
682-83, 687.
102. Lim, supranote 54, at 35-36.
103. Lee, supra note 8, at 115.

104. See Erin Aeran Chung, Korea and Japan's Multicultural Models for Immigrant
Incorporation,41 KOREA OBSERVER 649, 670 (2010).
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a "model minority" group, migrant workers continue to be denied the
right to permanent settlement.105 The status of marriage migrants
themselves as potential citizens is often contingent on the female
migrant's capacity to fulfill her assigned roles in the family as wife,
mother, and daughter-in-law, thereby solidifying the links between
marriage, family, and national membership.
The inclusion of marriage migrants in the multiple-nationality bill
attests to the role of international marriages in shaping and
transforming conceptions of national membership, identity, and
citizenship based on monocultural principles in Korea. As stipulated by
the new Nationality Law, marriage migrants who have been granted
the privilege of membership on the basis of lawful marriage to a Korean
national are considered equals to coethnic return migrants of the
Korean diaspora.106 On a more practical level, by allowing marriage
migrants to retain their native nationalities, Korean policymakers
aimed to encourage higher rates of naturalization, which, in Tomas
Hammar's words, is "the last step in a long process of integration into
the country."10 7
CONCLUSION

Korea and Japan have previously been identified as recent countries
of immigration with exclusionary immigration policies and ethnic
citizenship regimes. However, such categorizations cannot adequately
explain the recent changes to membership criteria as reflected in recent
reforms to both countries' nationality laws. These reforms suggest a
breakdown of monocultural membership as the acquisition of citizenship
becomes divorced from ethnocultural homogeneity. Such ongoing
transformations then raise questions about the heuristic value of the
ethnic-civic dichotomy, a concept used to generalize national conceptions
of membership and citizenship. Rather, as this Article has shown, the
analytical lens should be placed on the contested fluidity of membership
that lies in the interactions between state and social actors.
The divergent ways that Japan and Korea have attempted to
incorporate different immigrant groups into their societies reflect each
country's attempt to absorb greater social diversity while maintaining
social stability and democratic accountability. Although both countries
105. See generally Byoungha Lee, The Development of Korea's Immigration Policies:
Security, Accumulation, Fairness,and Institutional Legitimacy, 40 KOREA OBSERVER 763,
791 (2009).
106. See Gukjeok beob [Nationality Act], Act. No. 8892, art. 13.
107. Tomas Hammar, Dual Citizenship and Political Integration, 19 INT'L MIGRATION
REV. 438, 448 (1985).
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have applied the language of "multiculturalism" in their frameworks for
incorporating immigrants, neither has embraced in full the prospect of
cultural pluralism. On the contrary, each country's so-called
multicultural framework highlights the tensions between each society's
acknowledgement of the swelling ranks of immigrants within their
borders and their uneasiness with permanent immigrant settlement. In
both cases, gendered migration has unraveled the core of monocultural
conceptions of both the family and the nation, forcing the Japanese and
Korean states to redefine the meaning, terms, and rights of political and
social membership.

